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FAMILY LAW  
Allison Anna Tait * 
In the past year, Virginia courts have addressed a range of 
family law questions—new and old—that reflect the changing 
landscape of families and marriage. Questions related to same-
sex marriage and divorce have begun to appear on Virginia court 
dockets, including an important case the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia decided this year with respect to same-sex couples cohabit-
ing and the termination of spousal support. Family law courts al-
so saw shifts in gender norms—wives paying spousal support to 
their husbands and fathers being awarded physical custody of 
their children. These legal questions tested the limits of statutory 
language and helped to expand the legal understanding of mar-
riage, family, and parenthood. In addition, recurring questions 
about entry into and exit from marriage persisted. Courts ad-
dressed varied claims relating to marriage validity, equitable dis-
tribution, separate property, spousal and child support, and visit-
ation rights. This brief article provides an overview of some of the 
most salient cases, and those cases that will most likely have a 
lasting impact on this state‘s family law jurisprudence. 
I.  GETTING MARRIED 
In a year in which big changes happened on the federal front 
with respect to entry barriers to marriage,
1
 small things hap-
pened on the state level in Virginia. Most significantly, the Vir-
ginia legislature tightened restrictions on requirements for mi-
nors to marry. Courts addressed the question of what constitutes 
a valid marriage, providing an extremely technocratic answer in 
MacDougall v. Levick.
2
 
 
*    Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law.    
 1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 2. MacDougall v. Levick, 66 Va. App. 50, 782  S.E.2d  182 (2016); see discussion infra 
Part I.B.  
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A.  Legislation 
In the legislative realm, Virginia Code sections 20-23 and 20-26 
were amended to provide that persons authorized to perform 
marriages are not required to take an oath to do so.
3
 In addition, 
the amendments provide that these individuals shall not be con-
sidered Officers of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
4
  
Addressing the question of minors marrying, the legislature al-
so amended state rules in order to clarify the procedure. Specifi-
cally, changes to Virginia Code sections 16.1-331, 16.1-333, 16.1-
333.1, 20-45.1, 20-48, and 20-89.1 implement procedures dealing 
with the marriage of individuals over the age of sixteen, but un-
der the age of eighteen.
5
 The basic requirement is that individuals 
in this age group must file a petition before the appropriate Ju-
venile and Domestic Relations District Court. They must identify 
the identity of the persons to be married, as well as any relevant 
criminal history and history of protective orders.
6
 In addition, 
these individuals must also be emancipated for the purpose of be-
ing married and must present a copy of the emancipation order 
with the application for a marriage license.
7
 Upon receiving the 
petition, the court must hold a hearing in order to ensure that the 
minor is entering into the marriage of her own free will, that she 
is sufficiently mature to marry, that the marriage will not endan-
ger the safety of the minor, and that the marriage serves the mi-
nor‘s best interests.
8
 If either party fails to obtain an emancipa-
tion order and follow the required procedures, the marriage will 
be declared void, unless the marriage was lawfully entered into in 
another jurisdiction.
9
 
B.  Case Law 
In the courtroom, questions about how to lawfully enter into 
marriage likewise emerged. A case of particular interest was 
 
 3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-23, -26 (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 4. Id.   
 5. VA.  CODE  ANN. §§  16.1-331,  -333,  -333.1  (Cum. Supp. 2016);  id. §§  20-45.1,  -48, 
-89.1 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 6. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-331 (Cum. Supp. 2016); id. § 20-48 (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 7. Id. § 20-48 (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 8. Id. § 16.1-333.1 (Cum. Supp. 2016).  
 9. Id. § 20-45.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
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MacDougall v. Levick,
10
 in which the Virginia appellate court was 
called upon to determine whether a valid marriage had been con-
tracted in the absence of licensing.
11
 The couple in question par-
ticipated in a marriage ceremony with a rabbi, but they did not 
have a license at the time because it was ―an extraordinarily busy 
time.‖
12
 The couple had been planning their wedding, purchasing 
a home, and moving all at the same time.
13
 Moreover, ―[n]either 
Levick nor MacDougall thought about obtaining a marriage li-
cense because neither realized that they needed one.‖
14
 When they 
realized at the ceremony that they had no license, ―[t]he rabbi 
and the parties decided to ‗deal with that later because‘ everyone 
was ‗ready to do the wedding.‘‖
15
 The rabbi instructed the couple 
to obtain a license as soon as possible and send it to him for his 
signature.
16
  The couple did just that, sending the marriage li-
cense to the rabbi for his signature shortly after the solemniza-
tion ceremony.
17
 Consequently, neither party was present when 
the rabbi signed the license.
18
 Nevertheless, the couple assumed 
that they were legally married in the ensuing years.
19
 
Almost a decade later, in 2011, the wife filed for divorce and, 
with her divorce complaint, she filed a copy of a marital agree-
ment the couple had executed two years prior.
20
 The agreement 
stipulated that, in the case of divorce or separation, the husband 
would pay the wife spousal support in the amount of $150,000.
21
 
The wife sought pendente lite support according to the terms of 
this agreement, and the court ultimately awarded her $12,500 
per month until the final terms of support were established.
22
 In 
the middle of litigation, however, the husband opened a new line 
of inquiry by filing a petition for declaration of marital status.
23
 
 
 10. 66 Va. App. 50, 782 S.E.2d 182 (2016).  
 11. Id. at 57, 782 S.E.2d at 185–86.  
 12. Id. at 58, 782 S.E.2d at 186. 
 13. Id.   
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 59, 782 S.E.2d at 186.  
 19. Id.   
 20. Id.  
 21. Id 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.   
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The husband changed course and contended that, because of the 
faulty procedure with the marriage license, the couple was not 
lawfully married.
24
 Consequently, he argued, the marital agree-
ment was invalid and he was not responsible for spousal sup-
port.
25
 
Addressing the question of whether the couple had a valid 
marriage, the appellate court began by stating: ―The public policy 
of Virginia . . . has been to uphold the validity of the marriage 
status as for the best interest of society, except where marriage is 
prohibited between certain persons.‖
26
  The court also noted that 
Virginia public policy was to favor marriage.
27
 In the case at 
hand, however, the court concluded that these public policies in 
favor of finding a valid marriage did not apply.
28
 Looking to the 
technical details of state marriage law, the court observed that 
Virginia ―requires a license, followed by solemnization, to contract 
a lawful marriage.‖
29
 These requirements, the court further re-
marked, were ―mandatory rather than directory.‖
30
 Despite the 
statement, then, that ―[t]he state has no official interest in the 
place where a marriage occurs, or in the ceremony or ritual which 
surrounds the act,‖
31
 the court did take an official interest. Ac-
cording to the court: ―Mailing a license via express mail for a sig-
nature when the parties are not even present does not constitute 
‗solemnization‘ under any reasonable definition of the term.‖
32
 The 
parties were not, therefore, married and the husband was not be-
holden to the terms of the marital agreement. Moreover, the court 
concluded, the husband was not under any financial obligation 
whatsoever to his erstwhile wife.
33
 
 
 24. Id.   
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 63, 782 S.E.2d at 188. 
 27. Id.   
 28. Id. at 68–69, 782 S.E.2d at 191.  
 29. Id. at 64, 782 S.E.2d at 189. The court went on to say, ―[e]very marriage in this 
Commonwealth shall be under a license and solemnized in the manner herein provided.‖ 
Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-13 (Repl. Vol. 2016)).   
 30. Id. at 67, 782 S.E.2d at 190. 
 31. Id. (citing Cramer v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 561, 565, 202 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1974) 
(per curiam)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 76, 782 S.E.2d at 195 (―Our conclusion that the parties were never married 
means that MacDougall cannot obtain the distribution of marital property through equi-
table distribution because no marital estate ever existed, and neither can she obtain post-
divorce spousal support, because in the eyes of the law she was never a spouse to Levick.‖). 
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Arguing against this, the wife contended that curative or equi-
table doctrines could and should intervene to help her obtain a fi-
nancial settlement.
34
 As she pointed out, courts in other states 
routinely apply equitable doctrine in such cases in order to stem 
the unjust enrichment of the spouse who avoids support obliga-
tions.
35
 Curative doctrines, the court remarked, did not apply be-
cause there was no actual defect to cure with respect to the li-
cense: ―The medicine in Code § 20–31‘s cabinet is not formulated 
so as to spring to life a marriage that, in the eyes of Virginia law, 
never was.‖
36
 The court likewise refused to apply equitable doc-
trines to help the wife obtain any form of financial compensation, 
stating that public policy in Virginia militated against such appli-
cation.
37
 The court invoked an institutional role argument, observ-
ing: ―The legislature is the rightful branch of government to set 
Virginia‘s public policy with regard to an institution so founda-
tional, and of such paramount importance to society, as mar-
riage.‖
38
 The conclusion was not so much a call for reform, as a ra-
tionalization for a result that was clearly unjust to the wife. 
Without some change in law or judicial policy, this type of holding 
can and will injure divorcing spouses—many times women—
placed in an economically vulnerable position at divorce. 
II.  GETTING DIVORCED 
While getting married occupied one part of the legislature‘s and 
court system‘s attention, the great majority of time and analysis 
went into questions surrounding divorce. Claims about equitable 
distribution, spousal support, child support, and child custody 
were at the forefront on court dockets.  
A.  Equitable Distribution 
The legislature made one particularly long-awaited amend-
ment concerning separate property this past year. Legislators 
amended section 20-107.3(C) to provide that, if a court finds the 
 
 34. Id. at 78, 782 S.E.2d at 196 (―MacDougall, citing decisions from other states, also 
urges us to adopt the concept of marriage by estoppel.‖). 
 35. Id.   
 36. Id. at 70, 782 S.E.2d at 192. 
 37. Id. at 78–79, 782 S.E.2d at 196.  
 38. Id. at 78, 782 S.E.2d at 196.  
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separate property of one spouse in the possession or under the 
control of the other, then a court can order the transfer of such 
property back to the proper owner.
39
 
In case law, courts continued to confront continually occurring 
questions concerning property characterization, valuation, and 
distribution in the context of equitable distribution. One especial-
ly interesting valuation case involved a divorcing couple and their 
family-owned restaurant. In Zhang v. Tung,
40
 the husband con-
tested not only the valuation but also the court-ordered use of an 
expert accountant.
41
 The husband claimed that the trial court 
erred in appointing an expert accountant to perform the valua-
tion and, furthermore, that ―the testimony of the expert witness 
did not prove helpful to the trial court.‖
42
 The husband based this 
claim on the fact that the expert witness came up with two differ-
ent valuations and presented both to the court.
43
 
The story began when the couple filed for divorce and the res-
taurant, that they jointly owned and operated, was one of the ma-
jor marital assets.
44
 They had acquired the restaurant, Shun Xing 
Chinese Restaurant, in 2000 while they were married, and in 
2013, when they were divorcing, the value of the restaurant be-
came relevant for distribution purposes.
45
 The husband offered no 
valuation of his own, and the wife requested an ―award of fees 
and costs to allow her to retain an expert to determine the value 
of the Shun Xing Chinese Restaurant and carry on this suit.‖
46
 
The court, pursuant to this request, appointed an accounting firm 
to prepare a business valuation, and the husband did not timely 
object.
47
 
Accordingly, the accounting firm began to prepare its valua-
tion. The accountant, however, ran into a problem with ―conflict-
ing financial data.‖
48
 The conflict arose from differing financial 
 
 39. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 40. No. 1325-15-1, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 24, at *1 (Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016) (unpublished 
decision). 
 41. Id. at *1, *7. 
 42. Id. at *2, *7. 
 43. Id. at *9. 
 44. Id. at *2–3. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at *7. 
 47. Id. at *8. 
 48. Id. at *9–10. 
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records that the husband and wife provided, records that offered 
vastly different pictures of the restaurant‘s financial health.
49
 The 
husband provided the restaurant‘s tax returns, stating that they 
accurately reflected the restaurant‘s income and expenses.
50
 The 
wife, on the other hand, stated that the tax returns did not reflect 
many of the restaurant‘s cash transactions.
51
 She provided the ac-
countant with ―handwritten records showing cash sales, cash paid 
for supplies, and cash wages paid to employees.‖
52
 The resulting 
difference in valuation was significant. Using the husband‘s 
numbers, the restaurant was worth $34,000.
53
 Using the wife‘s in-
formation, the value of the restaurant was $399,000.
54
 The ac-
countant subsequently presented both valuations to the court, 
explaining the source of the difference, and offering the handwrit-
ten documents for the court to review.
55
 On review, the court en-
dorsed the second valuation done using the wife‘s information.
56
 
This valuation increased the value of the marital estate, and con-
sequently, when the court awarded the restaurant to the husband 
and the marital home to the wife, the court also ordered the hus-
band to pay $67,400 to equalize the values of the two properties.
57
 
On appeal the court, not surprisingly, affirmed the trial court‘s 
decision.
58
 What was surprising, on the other hand, was the fact 
that the husband sought an appeal when the case clearly brought 
to light certain discrepancies between declared and actual taxable 
income. 
Other cases dealt with factors used by trial courts to determine 
the final distribution of assets. For example, in the case of Ozfi-
dan v. Ozfidan,
59
 the appellate court addressed the question of 
what factors the trial court used and how the court applied them 
in distributing property.
60
 The couple married in 1998, while they 
 
 49. Id. at *10. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at *11. 
 57. Id. at *3. 
 58. Id. at *11. 
 59. Ozfidan v. Ozfidan, No. 1265-14-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 148, at *1 (Ct. App. May 
5, 2015) (unpublished decision). 
 60. Id. at *15–17. 
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were living in Texas and the husband was working toward a doc-
torate in economics.
61
 The wife worked at an advertising agency 
and as a flight attendant.
62
 When the husband graduated and ac-
cepted a job in Virginia, the couple moved to Richmond and the 
wife soon became pregnant.
63
 The couple agreed that the wife 
would stay at home with the children, at least until they started 
school.
64
 
In 2012, the wife filed for divorce, alleging that the husband 
was at fault on grounds of cruelty.
65
 When it came to the equitable 
distribution of marital assets, the trial court found that there was 
little to distribute because the couple had significant credit debt 
and because the husband had committed waste of marital proper-
ty during the separation period.
66
 The husband had, in fact, kept a 
truck that belonged to the family, depleted three credit union ac-
counts, as well as an Ameritrade account, and taken gold that the 
couple owned.
67
 Accordingly, the court awarded any profit from 
the sale of the marital home to the wife.
68
 She also received the 
home furnishings as well as her diamond ring.
69
 The car went to 
the wife, as did her IRA, and a portion of her husband‘s pension.
70
 
The debts were distributed to the husband.
71
 
The husband appealed this distribution, arguing that the trial 
court‘s decision was not supported by the factors listed in relevant 
Virginia Code provisions and that the trial court had not ade-
quately explained its use of the factors.
72
 On appeal, the court ob-
served that the trial court had done ―more than simply state that 
all of the statutory factors had been considered.‖
73
 The appellate 
court observed that the trial court had discussed the various fac-
tors in some detail in two separate rulings.
74
 Specifically, the trial 
 
 61. Id. at *1–2. 
 62. Id. at *2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at *4. 
 66. Id. at *7. 
 67. Id. at *6–7. 
 68. Id. at *7. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at *8. 
 72. Id. at *15–16. 
 73. Id. at *17. 
 74. See id. 
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court had addressed: ―the circumstances and factors which con-
tributed to the dissolution of the marriage, . . . including any 
ground for divorce under the provisions of subdivisions (1), (3) or 
(6) of § 20-91 or § 20-95‖;
75
 the ―debts and liabilities of each 
spouse, the basis for such debts and liabilities, and the property 
which may serve as security for such debts and liabilities‖;
76
 and 
the ―use or expenditure of marital property by either of the par-
ties for a nonmarital separate purpose or the dissipation of such 
funds, when such was done in anticipation of divorce or separa-
tion or after the last separation of the parties.‖
77
 
The appellate court also mentioned that Virginia law has no 
presumption of equal distribution that would require a trial court 
to justify an unequal one.
78
 Moreover, the wife had successfully 
proven cruelty, a factor that the trial court was justified in con-
sidering during distribution.
79
 The trial court had not, therefore, 
abused its discretion and the appellate court affirmed the distri-
bution.
80
 
B.  Spousal Support 
In the legislative arena, section 20-107.1(E) was amended to 
specifically state that courts can appropriately consider ―circum-
stances and factors which contributed to the dissolution . . . spe-
cifically including . . . any . . . ground for divorce‖ in awarding 
spousal support.
81
 This amendment reinforces the authority that 
courts have to factor fault into support calculations and addresses 
the amount and duration of an award. The legislature amended 
part (A) of the same provision to provide that a court may award 
spousal support ―notwithstanding a party‘s failure to prove his 
grounds for divorce, provided that a claim for support has been 
properly pled by the party seeking support.‖
82
 In addition, the leg-
islature amended section 20-103(A1) to clarify that spousal sup-
port ―shall be paid from the post-separation income‖ and that the 
 
 75. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2016)). 
 76. Id. at *17–18 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(7) (Repl. Vol. 2016)). 
 77. Id. at *18 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(10) (Repl. Vol. 2016)). 
 78. See id. at *18–19 (citing Matthews v. Matthews, 26 Va. App. 638, 645, 496 S.E.2d 
126, 129 (1998)). 
 79. See id. at *20. 
 80. See id. at *6–7. 
 81. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 82. Id. § 20-107.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
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court has the authority to order support payments be made from 
specific funding sources.
83
 
In the courts, questions concerning spousal support arose often 
and in many forms. One important and recurring question was 
when the denial of a spousal support award because of adultery 
constitutes manifest injustice. In Giraldi v. Giraldi, the question 
of manifest injustice appeared in the context of a reservation of 
support.
84
 In that case, the court set forth very plainly the princi-
ples on which reservation of support is awarded as well as the 
factors that trial courts should use in determining whether reser-
vation is appropriate.
85
 The husband in Giraldi was awarded a 
divorce from his wife on the ground of her adultery.
86
 They had 
been married for just over a decade in 2012 when he filed for di-
vorce, and the wife testified at trial that she had been having an 
affair to seek ―emotional support.‖
87
 At the time of the divorce, the 
husband‘s monthly income was $16,432, although his income was 
not guaranteed past 2015.
88
 The wife earned $3369 on a monthly 
basis from her position as a schoolteacher.
89
  At the end of the tri-
al, the circuit court judge ruled:  
I don‘t know what‘s going to happen in the future with reference to 
either one of you. Notwithstanding the adultery that‘s the grounds 
for the divorce in this case. I think it would constitute a manifest in-
justice to deny a reservation quite different in a matter of support so 
each of you will have a reservation one to the other.
90
  
Each party was, accordingly, awarded a reservation of spousal 
support for a period of six years and two months, as determined 
by the length of the marriage.
91
 
On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court erred by 
awarding a reservation of spousal support to the wife, and the 
appellate court agreed with him.
92
 The court, stating the basics, 
 
 83. Id. § 20-103(A1) (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 84. See 64 Va. App. 676, 679, 771 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2015).  
 85. See id. at 683, 771 S.E.2d at 691. 
 86. Id. at 679, 771 S.E.2d at 689.  
 87. Id. at 680, 771 S.E.2d at 690. 
 88. Id. at 681, 685, 771 S.E.2d at 690, 692.  
 89. Id. at 681, 771 S.E.2d at 690. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 679 n.2, 681, 771 S.E.2d at 689 n.2, 690. 
 92. Id. at 679–80, 771 S.E.2d at 689.  
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reiterated that adultery is generally a bar to receiving spousal 
support
93
 except when denying support would result in ―manifest 
injustice.‖
94
 Manifest injustice, the court explained, must be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence based on two factors: (1) 
the respective degrees of fault of the parties during the marriage 
and (2) the relative economic circumstances of the parties.
95
 The 
court remarked that ―the circuit court never expressly mentioned 
the two factors upon which a clear and convincing demonstration 
of manifest injustice must be based.‖
96
 Moreover, the court stated 
that, ―‗manifest injustice‘ cannot be speculative.‖
97
 When the trial 
court remarked, ―I don‘t know what‘s going to happen,‖
98
 the 
judge was speculating about the possibility of manifest injustice 
at a future point in time. This, the appellate court stated, was in-
correct and incompatible with the idea of injustice being ―mani-
fest.‖
99
 The trial court‘s failure to use the two factors of respective 
fault and economic circumstances in deciding to reserve spousal 
support, coupled with the trial court‘s speculative approach, con-
stituted reversible error.
100
 
In Mundy v. Mundy, another case about manifest injustice, the 
court further clarified what circumstances might constitute mani-
fest injustice and lead to the denial of spousal support.
101
 Again 
relying on the manifest injustice exception, the trial court award-
ed support to the wife, who had committed adultery.
102
 The wife 
―admitted to numerous acts of adultery with a member of the rock 
band in which she participated and with her personal trainer.‖
103
 
The husband, on the other hand, ―took the family on vacations‖ 
and the couple ―shared weekend trips together, and they went to 
fine restaurants, the theater, the opera, and the symphony.‖
104
 He 
 
 93. Id. at 682, 771 S.E.2d at 691.  
 94. Id. at 683, 771 S.E.2d at 691.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 684, 771 S.E.2d at 691. 
 97. Id. at 685–86, 771 S.E.2d at 692. 
 98. Id. at 681, 771 S.E.2d at 690. 
 99. Id. at 685–86, 771 S.E.2d at 692. 
100. Id. at 684, 771 S.E.2d at 691.  
101. 66 Va. App. 177, 179, 783 S.E.2d 535, 536 (2016). 
102. Id. at 179, 783 S.E.2d at 536. 
103. Id. at 181, 783 S.E.2d at 536.  
104. Id. at 180, 783 S.E.2d at 536.  
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supported her interest in the arts, and he ―attended and recorded 
her performances in her rock band.‖
105
 
The divorce settlement gave the wife ―assets worth approxi-
mately $1.8 million, including about $397,000 in cash and over 
$1.3 million in retirement funds.‖
106
 The husband retained the 
marital residence and agreed to pay all educational expenses for 
the children, one of whom was in college and the other in medical 
school.
107
 The husband earned an annual salary in excess of 
$850,000, while the wife had not engaged in significant paid work 
outside the home.
108
 Nevertheless, the court noted that she had a 
degree in mechanical engineering and ―could find part-time em-
ployment earning approximately $22 per hour.‖
109
 Because of the 
significant disparity in earning capacities, the trial court relied 
on the exception for manifest injustice and awarded support to 
the wife despite her adultery.
110
 
On appeal, the husband claimed that circumstances did not 
demonstrate that denial of support would produce a manifest in-
justice.
111
 The appellate court agreed. Using the analytic frame-
work of relative fault and economic circumstances, the appellate 
court concluded that the trial court had erred and that no mani-
fest injustice would be produced by a denial of spousal support for 
the wife.
112
 In terms of fault, the court stated that the wife was 
clearly at fault and that the trial court had even stated that ―the 
relative degree of fault‖ weighed ―heavily in favor‖ of the hus-
band.
113
 Moreover, the court concluded that the wife had received 
a sufficiently substantial settlement, such that she would not be 
put in circumstances of economic hardship without support.
114
 Ul-
timately, the court reasoned: ―It would be a manifest injustice to 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 181, 783 S.E.2d at 536. 
107. Id. at 181, 783 S.E.2d at 536–37. 
108. Id. at 180, 783 S.E.2d at 536. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 179, 783 S.E.2d at 536.  
111. Id.  
112. Id. at 184, 783 S.E.2d at 538. 
113. Id. at 183, 783 S.E.2d at 538. 
114. Id. at 181, 783 S.E.2d at 536. 
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require a faultless spouse to pay support to a work-capable, mil-
lionaire spouse, guilty of repeated acts of adultery with several 
co-respondents.‖
115
 
Other cases addressed support modification, including Bailey v. 
Bailey.
116
 The couple in Bailey divorced in 2013, at which time the 
court ordered the husband to pay spousal support of $22,500 
monthly for a period of three years and then $20,000 for a period 
of twelve years.
117
 The support payments were scheduled to ter-
minate at the end of the fifteen-year period.
118
 The husband also 
agreed to pay the private school tuition up to $15,000 per child 
per year through high school, as long as his annual income did 
not fall below 80 percent of his 2012 income, which was 
$912,000.
119
 
Two years later, in February 2015, the husband filed a request 
for the modification of his support obligations on the grounds of a 
substantial reduction in his income.
120
 He was an equity partner 
in a law firm and specialized in intellectual property litigation.
121
 
He had stated at the time of the settlement, and his wife had 
agreed, that his income fluctuated from year to year—in 2012 he 
earned approximately $1,040,000, in 2013 he earned approxi-
mately $990,000, and in 2014 he earned approximately 
$850,000.
122
 His projected income for 2015, however, was 
$668,710.
123
 
In response to his modification request, the wife argued that 
the husband knew at the time he negotiated the divorce settle-
ment not only that his income fluctuated, but also that it was 
likely to decrease.
124
 At that time, the husband knew his billable 
hours were down and that he had lost several important clients.
125
 
Additionally, there was uncertainty within the firm because of a 
 
115. Id. at 184, 783 S.E.2d at 538. 
116. No. 0981-15-4, 2016 Va. App. LEXIS 80, at *1 (Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2016) (un-
published decision).  
117. Id. at *1–2. 
118. Id. at *2. 
119. Id. at *2–3. 
120. Id. at *3. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at *5. 
125. Id. at *3–4. 
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prospective merger.
126
 Based on these facts, the trial court denied 
the motion for support modification, reasoning that ―there were 
times during the marriage that husband‘s compensation went up 
or down, and, therefore, it was something the parties contemplat-
ed.‖
127
 The provision exempting the husband from paying the pri-
vate school tuition if his income dropped below a certain level, the 
court stated, confirmed that the parties knew there was a possi-
bility of fluctuation.
128
 
On appeal, the court reiterated the standard that ―the court 
may increase, decrease or terminate the amount or duration of 
the award upon finding that . . . there has been a material change 
in the circumstances of the parties, not reasonably in the contem-
plation of the parties when the award was made.‖
129
 It was true, 
the court observed, that the husband knew at the time of the set-
tlement that he was likely to experience some sort of decline in 
income.
130
 However, the court added, the husband did not know 
with certainty that the decline would happen, nor did he know at 
the time how drastic it would be.
131
 At the time, the husband also 
believed—incorrectly, it turned out—that he ―would be able to 
win new clients to compensate for the loss of the major client who 
had left.‖
132
 What the husband ultimately experienced was nearly 
a 40 percent decline in income, which, the court remarked, even 
the wife‘s own expert witness testified was a significant drop.
133
 
The amount of the decline, therefore, constituted a ―material 
change‖ and the appellate court reversed the denial for modifica-
tion.
134
 
Finally, one of the most interesting support cases in light of the 
new status of same-sex marriage and the inescapable frequency 
with which same-sex divorces will begin to occur, was Luttrell v. 
Cucco.
135
 In Luttrell, the court addressed the termination of 
spousal support when the party receiving support is in a same-
 
126. Id. at *4. 
127. Id. at *5. 
128. Id. at *5–6. 
129. Id. at *8. 
130. Id. at *3–4. 
131. See id. at *11–12. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at *10–12. 
134. Id. at *13. 
135. 291 Va. 308, 784 S.E.2d 707 (2016). 
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sex relationship. The husband, who had been paying spousal sup-
port to his ex-wife since the divorce, sought to terminate pay-
ments on the grounds that his ex-wife was ―engaged to be mar-
ried‖ and had been ―cohabiting continuously‖ with another 
woman.
136
 He sought this relief pursuant to section 20-109 of the 
Virginia Code, which provides that support may be terminated 
―[u]pon order of the court based upon clear and convincing evi-
dence that the spouse receiving support has been habitually co-
habiting with another person in a relationship analogous to a 
marriage for one year or more.‖
137
 The ex-wife did not dispute the 
allegations that she was cohabiting with another person.
138
 In-
stead, she argued that because that other person was a woman, 
they were not cohabiting within the Code‘s meaning.
139
 Both the 
trial and appellate court agreed with the ex-wife, concluding, ―on-
ly opposite-sex couples could cohabit for purposes of [the Code].‖
140
 
Same-sex marriage had not been legal in Virginia in 1997, when 
the statutory language had been enacted, and consequently co-
habiting ―in a relationship analogous to marriage‖ was not possi-
ble for same-sex couples.
141
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the ruling. 
Looking to the legislative history, the court observed that in 1997, 
the General Assembly had amended the relevant code provi-
sion.
142
 Originally, when the amendment was introduced, the pro-
posed language specifically stated that cohabitation ―with a per-
son of the opposite sex‖ was ground for termination of support.
143
 
This modification was not, however, approved. The court rea-
soned, ―[b]y declining to modify the word ‗person‘ with the phrase 
‗of the opposite sex,‘ the General Assembly signaled its intention 
that ‗person‘ would include individuals of either sex.‖
144
 The court 
 
136. Id. at 311, 784 S.E.2d at 708.  
137. Id. at 311–12, 784 S.E.2d at 708; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
138. Luttrell, 291 Va. at 312, 784 S.E.2d at 709.  
139. Id.  
140. Id. 
141. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997) (stating that same-sex mar-
riage was illegal in Virginia in 1997).  
142. Luttrell, 291 Va. at 318, 784 S.E.2d at 712. 
143. Id. at 315, 784 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting H.B. 1341 Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 
1997)). 
144. Id. at 316, 784 S.E.2d at 711. 
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stated that the fact that same-sex marriage had not been legal in 
1997 was not relevant.
145
 
Rather, the court stated, the legislature meant to recognize 
―that an individual who has entered a committed, financially in-
terdependent relationship with a third person is no longer de-
pendent upon his or her ex-spouse in the same manner as when 
the agreement was executed.‖
146
 The rules, therefore, were de-
signed to ―prevent one former spouse from obtaining a windfall at 
the expense of the other.‖
147
 If the provision was read to exclude 
cohabiting same-sex couples, the court remarked, the results 
would in fact be unjust because ―two identically situated individ-
uals with identical spousal support awards would receive opposite 
treatment‖ based on whether the party receiving support was in a 
same-sex or different-sex relationship.
148
 This conclusion righted 
two lower court opinions that would have set an unfair and illogi-
cal precedent at a time when same-sex divorce and cohabitation 
cases are poised to appear in great numbers on state court dock-
ets. 
C.  Child Support 
Support modifications were an issue for Virginia courts not on-
ly in the context of spousal support, but also child support. In Ev-
erett v. Carome,
149
 for example, the husband sought a downward 
adjustment of his child support obligations, as set forth in the di-
vorce decree.
150
 The husband and wife were divorced in 2005 and, 
per the property settlement agreement (―PSA‖), the husband was 
responsible for paying child support for the couple‘s two children, 
a son and daughter.
151
 The PSA provided that the husband pay 
the wife $5000 on a monthly basis to help cover the costs of ―two 
private-school tuition [payments], summer camps, work-related 
child care, transportation, insurances, in addition to food, cloth-
ing and housing.‖
152
 The payments were to begin in July 2004, and 
 
145. Id.   
146. Id. at 317, 784 S.E.2d at 711. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 317, 784 S.E.2d at 711–12. 
149. 65 Va. App. 177, 775 S.E.2d 449 (2015).  
150. Id. at 181, 185–86, 775 S.E.2d at 451, 453.  
151. Id. at 180, 775 S.E.2d at 451. 
152. Id. 
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continue until each child had graduated from college.
153
 The ex-
spouses were to share the costs of undergraduate education for 
both children.
154
 The agreement also stated: ―In the event that 
Husband ever seeks a downward adjustment in his child support 
obligations, Wife shall be entitled to pursue her marital share of 
Husband‘s business interests and to pursue spousal support, both 
of which were waived to obtain child support beyond Virginia‘s 
guidelines.‖
155
 
When the husband filed his motion to modify the child support, 
he cited a material change in circumstances based on the fact 
that the son had turned eighteen years old and had enrolled in 
college.
156
  In addition, the husband noted that because the daugh-
ter had turned fourteen, childcare costs had decreased.
157
 Fur-
thermore, the daughter had begun receiving a scholarship at her 
private school, and the wife was enjoying a significant increase in 
her income.
158
 The wife, however, argued that the PSA clearly re-
quired the husband to pay $5000 monthly until both children had 
finished college, and that the court could not modify what was set 
forth in the PSA.
159
 The wife further argued that, even if a reduc-
tion could be made for one child, then the ―husband would need to 
make up for such a reduction by increasing his support payments 
attributable to [the son], so that husband‘s monthly payments 
still had to total at least $5000.‖
160
 
The court did not, however, find the wife‘s arguments persua-
sive. To begin, the court stated that no judicial modification by 
the trial court was possible for children who were no longer mi-
nors.
161
 Addressing the modification request more generally, the 
court stated that there were two possible outcomes were the 
wife‘s argument to prevail.
162
 The circuit court could potentially 
allow a downward adjustment of the daughter‘s support and then 
 
153. Id. at 181, 775 S.E.2d at 451. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. Another provision of the PSA also stated that ―in the event Husband seeks a 
downward adjustment in his child support obligations, he shall be responsible for all of 
Wife‘s attorney‘s fees and costs.‖ Id.  
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 181–82, 775 S.E.2d at 451. 
160. Id. at 182, 775 S.E.2d at 452. 
161. Id. at 187, 775 S.E.2d at 454. 
162. Id. at 190, 775 S.E.2d at 455. 
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the support going to the son would have to increase to reach the 
$5000 total.
163
 Alternately, if the son‘s support amount was not 
modifiable, then the amount the daughter was receiving would 
also have to stay the same in order to stay at $5000 total.
164
 
Quite to the contrary, the court concluded, nothing in the PSA 
stated that the ―amount of support cannot be apportioned be-
tween the parties‘ two children—or that support must remain 
fixed at $5,000 per month even if modification in child support for 
the minor child may otherwise be warranted.‖
165
 The court also 
remarked that the couple clearly contemplated that the support 
amount could be modified because they had inserted the PSA 
provision concerning possible modification and the consequences 
of doing so.
166
 Ultimately, then, the court held that the husband‘s 
―total monthly child support obligation may be apportioned be-
tween the parties‘ two children and that the total amount of sup-
port may be adjusted downward (as well as upward) so long as 
the parties‘ daughter, S.E., is still a minor.‖
167
 The case was re-
manded back to the circuit court with instructions to determine 
both how to divide the total support between the two children and 
whether there was a material change that would warrant the 
downward modification of support for the daughter, thereby re-
ducing the husband‘s overall payment.
168
 
In Milam v. Milam,
169
 the husband likewise petitioned the court 
for a downward modification of his child support. To his surprise, 
however, he ended up with a court-ordered increase instead.
170
 In 
that case, the father and mother were married from 1994 until 
2012 and had five children together.
171
 The father‘s petition was 
based on the fact that one child had reached the age of eighteen 
and, consequently, only three children were therefore eligible for 
support.
172
 After the hearing to reduce support, the trial court is-
sued an opinion stating that the father‘s income was $11,199 per 
month while the mother‘s income from employment alone was 
 
163. Id. at 190, 775 S.E.2d at 455–56. 
164. Id. at 190, 775 S.E.2d at 456. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 190–91, 775 S.E.2d at 456.   
167. Id. at 192, 775 S.E.2d at 457. 
168. Id. 
169. 65 Va. App. 439, 778 S.E.2d 535 (2015). 
170. Id. at 446, 778 S.E.2d at 538. 
171. Id. at 447, 778 S.E.2d at 539. 
172. See id. 
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about $745 per month.
173
 Because the mother‘s income was low, 
the court also determined that her income was below 150 percent 
of the federal poverty level for all relevant purposes.
174
 The court 
found, based on the mother‘s income, that the father‘s support ob-
ligation was $1380 monthly for the support of the three children 
who were minors.
175
 The court also addressed the father‘s failure 
to pay to that point and the fact that he had arrearages in the 
amount of $23,559.94.
176
 
On appeal, the father argued that, as a matter of law, the court 
erred in increasing his support obligation when he had filed a mo-
tion for reduction.
177
 The relevant statute, Code section 20-108, 
provided:  
The court may, from time to time . . . on petition of either of the par-
ents, or on its own motion . . . revise and alter such decree concern-
ing the care, custody, and maintenance of the children and make a 
new decree concerning the same, as the circumstances of the parents 
and the benefit of the children may require.
178
 
The father established a material change and, consequently, 
the circuit court was ―required to determine the presumptive 
child support amount by using the statutory guidelines.‖
179
 Never-
theless, using these guidelines, the court increased rather than 
decreased the support obligation.
180
 This was, the appellate court 
concluded, appropriate and correct:  
[W]e hold that when a motion for modification of child support is be-
fore the court, the court may increase or decrease the amount of child 
support pursuant to the statutory guidelines, regardless of the word-
ing of the motion seeking modification and regardless of whether the 
other parent specifically requests such relief.
181
 
The father also argued that the trial court had erred by includ-
ing one of the adult children as part of the household for purposes 
of determining the mother‘s status vis-à-vis the poverty guide-
 
173. Id. at 448–49, 778 S.E.2d at 539–40. 
174. Id. at 449, 778 S.E.2d at 540. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 446, 778 S.E.2d at 538. 
178. VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-108 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
179. Milam, 65 Va. App. at 452, 778 S.E.2d at 541. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 454, 778 S.E.2d at 542. 
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lines.
182
 The father argued that by including children he was not 
obligated to support in the household size, the court ―creat[ed] a 
de facto obligation for [father] to support a grown child whom 
he . . . otherwise has no legal obligation to support.‖
183
 The appel-
late court disagreed, remarking that the determination of a pov-
erty guideline amount ―has nothing to do with the number of 
children father is obligated to support.‖
184
 Rather, the court stat-
ed, ―the determination of whether mother‘s income falls below 
150 percent of the poverty guideline is to help ensure that her 
support obligations do not seriously impair her ability to main-
tain minimal adequate housing and to provide other basic neces-
sities for her minor children.‖
185
 
A third child support case examined the question of income im-
putation in relation to a downward support modification. In Mur-
phy v. Murphy,
186
 the father and mother divorced in 2013 and the 
father had primary physical custody of the couple‘s two sons and 
received child support from the mother.
187
 A year later the court 
modified the mother‘s support, reducing it based on a reduction in 
her salary from $170,000 to $108,000 after she changed jobs.
188
 
The father appealed the modification, arguing that the mother 
was voluntarily under-employed and should have been required 
to pay support ―based on an imputation of her prior income.‖
189
 
At the time of the divorce, the mother earned between $140,000 
and $170,000 annually (variable because of commissions) in a po-
sition that required long hours as well as evening and weekend 
work.
190
 After the divorce, the mother ―took a position that offered 
traditional hours and the ability to work from home.‖
191
 The 
drawback was that she reduced her salary to approximately 
$110,000 per year.
192
 The court modified her support based on this 
 
182. Id. at 454, 778 S.E.2d at 542. 
183. Id. at 457, 778 S.E.2d at 543–44 (emphasis in original). 
184. Id. at 457, 778 S.E.2d at 544. 
185. Id.  
186. 65 Va. App. 581, 779 S.E.2d 236 (2015). 
187. See id. at 584, 779 S.E.2d at 237. 
188. Id. at 583, 779 S.E.2d at 236–37. 
189. Id. at 583, 779 S.E.2d at 237.  
190. Id. at 584, 779 S.E.2d at 237. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
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salary reduction, using the statutory guidelines.
193
 The father ar-
gued that the court should have deviated from the guidelines be-
cause the mother was voluntarily under-employed and ―[i]ncome 
may be imputed ‗to a party who is voluntarily unemployed or vol-
untarily underemployed.‘‖
194
 
The appellate court first dispelled any notion that there was a 
―mandatory imputation rule‖ by reviewing the case law prior to 
2006.
195
 For example, in the Antonelli
196
 case, the state supreme 
court had concluded that a lower court did not err, in Murphy, 
when it imputed income to a father who had taken a new position 
because ―the father assumed the risk of making less money, and 
that risk should not be borne by his children.‖
197
 There was not 
necessarily, however, a mandatory imputation. Moreover, in 
2006, the legislature enacted amendments that ―plainly super-
sede any ‗mandatory imputation‘ rule.‖
198
 At that time, the legisla-
ture added language stating that:  
[A]ny consideration of imputed income based on a change in a party‘s 
employment shall be evaluated with consideration of the good faith 
and reasonableness of employment decisions made by the party, in-
cluding to attend and complete an educational or vocational program 
likely to maintain or increase the party‘s earning potential.
199
  
The new rules required a judge to consider not just the party‘s 
underemployment, but also whether the decision to take a reduc-
tion in salary was done in good faith and reasonableness. ―Impu-
tation,‖ the appellate court remarked, ―cannot be mandatory in 
all cases of voluntary under-employment, as that would prevent a 
judge from performing this inquiry.‖
200
 
Applying the rule to the facts, the circuit court considered:  
[A]ll the relevant evidence, including the advantages children receive 
from having two active and present parents, mother‘s availability in 
 
193. Id. at 584–85, 592, 779 S.E.2d at 237, 241. 
194. Id. at 583, 585, 779 S.E.2d at 237 (quoting Brody v. Brody, 16 Va. App. 647, 650, 
432 S.E.2d 20, 22 (1993)).  
195. Id. at 585–86, 779 S.E.2d at 238. 
196. Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 156, 409 S.E.2d 117, 119–20 (1991). 
197. Murphy, 65 Va. App. at 588, 779 S.E.2d at 239.  
198. Id. at 586, 779 S.E.2d at 238. 
199. Id. at 591, 779 S.E.2d at 240 (emphasis in original); Act of Apr. 6, 2006, ch. 785, 
2006 Va. Acts 1149, 1149–50 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(B)(3) 
(Cum. Supp. 2006)).  
200. Id. 
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the event of emergencies, her ability to attend school events and take 
the children to doctor‘s appointments, reduced child care costs, and 
the other benefits that flowed to the children from her flexible 
schedule.
201
 
The mother‘s choice to reduce her salary and take a new position 
was in the best interest of her children. Had the trial court decid-
ed to impute income to the mother, the court would have been 
obliged ―to make express findings on the record to support the de-
viation from the presumptive amount. Imputing income is the ex-
ception, not the rule.‖
202
 Accordingly, there was no error and the 
modification stood.
203
 
D.  Child Custody and Visitation 
In the custody and visitation realm, one particularly interest-
ing case involved the termination of grandparental rights upon 
adoption. In Harvey v. Flockhart,
204
 the visitation dispute occurred 
between the grandparents and the adoptive parents. The adoptive 
parents, the Flockharts, received custody of the two children in 
question through a Shenandoah County Department of Social 
Services foster placement in 2011, when one child was approxi-
mately one-and-one-half years old and the other was approxi-
mately six months old.
205
 The rights of the natural parents were 
subsequently terminated and, at that time, both the Flockharts 
and the grandparents, the Harveys, petitioned for custody of the 
children.
206
 In 2012, over a year after the termination of parental 
rights, the court awarded the Flockharts legal custody and grant-
ed visitation rights to the grandparents.
207
 Soon after that, the 
Flockharts filed a petition for adoption, which the court grant-
ed.
208
 The grandparents, however, filed a motion to vacate the or-
der on the grounds that ―they had not received notice of the adop-
tion proceedings.‖
209
 The court granted that motion, scheduled a 
 
201. Id. at 592, 779 S.E.2d at 241.  
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 593, 779 S.E.2d at 241. 
204. Harvey v. Flockhart, 65 Va. App. 131, 775 S.E.2d 427 (2015). 
205. Id. at 135, 775 S.E.2d at 428.  
206. Id. at 135, 775 S.E.2d at 428–29. 
207. Id. at 135, 775 S.E.2d at 429.  
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
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hearing on the Flockharts‘ petition, and allowed the grandparents 
to intervene.
210
 
Subsequently, the Department of Social Services completed a 
report concerning the Department‘s investigation into the Flock-
harts‘ suitability.
211
  The Department was, however, forced to file 
an addendum shortly thereafter because of a complaint—from an 
anonymous source that turned out to be the grandmother—that 
the children were living in unsafe conditions in the Flockharts‘ 
basement and that the swimming pool in the backyard was not 
properly gated.
212
 The Flockharts fixed the problems by moving 
the children into bedrooms on the main floor that were equipped 
with smoke alarms and placing a lock on the pool gate.
213
 
At a hearing on the Flockharts‘ petition for adoption, the court 
heard testimony from a licensed social worker who testified about 
her  home  observations.  She  stated  that  the  children  were 
―very bonded‖  to  the  Flockharts  and  loved  them  ―very  
much.‖
214
 She also testified about the children‘s ambivalence 
about visitation with their grandparents: ―[T]hey experience con-
fusion ‗about what they‘re told [at the Harveys‘] versus when 
they‘re home‘ . . . . And it has a direct impact on them with their 
relationship with their parents and their siblings.‖
215
 The social 
worker also ―expressed concern that the visitation triggered ‗[l]ots 
of anxiety‘ in [the children] and, for one of them, some ‗regressive 
behaviors.‘‖
216
 The Flockharts themselves testified that ―the visit-
ation was having an adverse effect on the children and on the 
family unit.‖
217
 At  the  end  of  the  hearing,  the  court  granted 
the  Flockharts‘ petition for adoption.
218
 The court found that 
―[t]he  parties  are  unable  to  cooperate  in  and  resolve disputes 
regarding  the  children,  in  part,  because  the  Harveys  refuse 
to  recognize  the  Flockharts  as  the parents of the children.‖
219
 
 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 135–36, 775 S.E.2d at 429.  
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 137, 775 S.E.2d at 430.  
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 136, 775 S.E.2d at 429.  
218. Id. at 137–38, 775 S.E.2d at 430.  
219. Id. 
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At the same time, the court terminated the Harveys‘ visitation 
rights.
220
 
The Harveys, on appeal, argued that their rights had been im-
properly terminated because these rights derived not just from 
their status as grandparents but also from being ―persons of in-
terest.‖
221
 The court held on appeal, however, that 1997 legislative 
amendments had overruled Thrift v. Baldwin,
222
 which had held 
that grandparents held a legitimate interest even after adoption 
of the children by another family.
223
 The court noted that Code 
section 63.2-1215 was amended, for example, to read that: 
The birth parents, and the parents by previous adoption, if any, ex-
cept where a final order of adoption is entered pursuant to § 63.1–
231, and any other person whose interest in the child derives from or 
through such parent or previous adoptive parent, including but not 
limited to grandparents, stepparents, former stepparents, blood rela-
tives and family members, other than any such parent who is the 
husband or wife of one of the petitioners, shall, by such final order of 
adoption, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to 
the child including the right to petition any court for visitation with 
the child.
224
 
These amendments were designed, the court stated, to ―reflect 
the General Assembly‘s intention that an adoption order fully 
sever the adopted child‘s legal ties to the previous family.‖
225
 
Moreover, ―[i]n providing for this clean break, the General As-
sembly eliminated a potential source of disruption in the growing 
bond between the adopted child and the adopting family.‖
226
 The 
statute, the court remarked, was meant to eliminate conflictual 
situations with the potential to do harm to the children
227
—the 
very situation that was playing out between the Flockharts and 
the Harveys. 
Finally, the grandparents argued that the adoption was not in 
the best interest of the children.
228
 The court did not find this ar-
 
220. Id. at 138–39, 775 S.E.2d at 430. 
221. Id. at 141, 775 S.E.2d at 431. 
222. Id. at 139, 775 S.E.2d at 431. 
223. Thrift v. Baldwin, 23 Va. App. 18, 20, 473 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1996). 
224. Harvey, 65 Va. App. at 140, 775 S.E.2d at 431 (emphasis in original) (citing Act of 
Mar. 21, 1997, ch. 690, 1997 Va. Acts 1644, 1649). 
225. Id. at 140, 775 S.E.2d at 431.  
226. Id. 
227. Id.  
228. Id. at 144–45, 775 S.E.2d at 433. 
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gument persuasive. The court said that the report prepared by 
the Department of Social Services provided ample evidence that 
―the Flockharts and the children have bonded over a period of 
years and that the Flockharts can provide the children with a 
stable, nurturing, and loving upbringing.‖
229
 The Flockharts 
gained custody and the grandparents, driven to create conflict 
and animosity, lost all rights to see their grandchildren.
230
 
Relocation, in other cases, was also an issue with respect to vis-
itation and custody rights. In Wheeler v. Wheeler,
231
 the court of 
appeals took up the question of relocation and visitation. The 
mother and father in that case were married in 2004, at which 
time the mother was in the Navy.
232
 The father had been in the 
Navy as well but was discharged on account of a ―personality dis-
order.‖
233
 In 2007, the couple moved to Virginia because of the 
mother‘s orders and she continued to be deployed until 2013 
when she received a ―humanitarian package reassignment‖ that 
allowed her be at home with her husband, who had been diag-
nosed with severe anxiety and depression, and the children.
234
 The 
time at home brought more conflict, however, and the couple de-
cided to divorce in 2013.
235
 The mother was required to go back 
out to sea and sought assignments that were ―less arduous and 
shorter in duration,‖ ultimately obtaining a position in San Die-
go.
236
  After receiving orders from the Navy to transfer to San Di-
ego, the mother petitioned the court for permission to relocate 
there with the children.
237
 The father objected, but the trial court 
granted the relocation.
238
 
On appeal, the father argued that the circuit court had erred by 
granting the mother ―additional latitude‖ because of her military 
status and career.
239
 At trial, the court stated: ―The Court feels 
that it has additional latitude, however, to treat the case of a uni-
 
229. Id. at 145, 775 S.E.2d at 434. 
230. See id. at 134, 775 S.E.2d at 428. 
231. No. 2230-14-1, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 173, at *1 (Ct. App. May 19, 2015) (un-
published decision).  
232. Id. at *2.  
233. Id.  
234. Id. at *2–3.  
235. Id. at *3. 
236. Id.  
237. Id.  
238. Id. at *3–4. 
239. Id. at *5. 
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formed member of the Armed Forces of the United States bearing 
military orders to report to a new duty station as something other 
than a generic relocation case.‖
240
 Relying on Rubino v. Rubino, 
the father argued that the Virginia Military Parents Equal Pro-
tection Act ―does not establish a generalized preference for the 
military parent for purposes of child custody or visitation.‖
241
 The 
appellate court noted that, while the trial court had indeed men-
tioned her military status, the trial court had used the appropri-
ate statutory factors in determining whether relocation was ap-
propriate and had kept ―primary focus‖ on the best interest of the 
children.
242
 Specifically, the trial court had concluded that: ―If the 
Court refused [mother‘s] request and she separates from the Na-
vy, as she testified she would, the children will lose a significant 
source of stability—the family‘s only income, their health insur-
ance, and other military benefits; such circumstances would be a 
disruption in the status quo.‖
243
 
The father also argued that the trial court accorded inappro-
priate weight to the ―potential harm in mother‘s career if she did 
not relocate, rather than to the benefits of the children.‖
244
 The 
appellate court, however, agreed with the trial court‘s emphasis 
on the fact that the mother was the sole wage earner in the fami-
ly.
245
 The father had not worked for many years and provided no 
financial contributions to the family; and the court mentioned 
that ―[w]ith his previous hospitalizations, father proved that he 
was incapable of caring for the children on an extended basis.‖
246
 
For that reason, the mother‘s career was of significant importance 
to the family and to the care of the children. 
Lastly, the father contended that the children‘s move to San 
Diego would irreparably harm his relationship with them.
247
 The 
appellate court reiterated that the trial court had encouraged the 
father to relocate with the rest of the family, which he could do 
because he was not tied down with a job.
248
 Alternatively, the trial 
 
240. Id. at *6.  
241. Id. at *6–7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rubino v. Rubino, 64 Va. App. 256, 263, 
767 S.E.2d 260, 264 (2015)). 
242. Wheeler, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 175, at *7–8.  
243. Id. at *5–6 (alteration in original).  
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court was willing to grant the father summers in Virginia and 
liberal visitation in California with the children if he chose not to 
relocate.
249
 The father, however, stated he had an ―intense fear of 
flying‖ and ―would not go to California to exercise his visita-
tion.‖
250
 Because of this statement, the appellate court concluded: 
―[I]t is apparent that his fears, not the trial court, are preventing 
him from visiting with his children.‖
251
 The mother and children 
were free, subsequently, to move to San Diego. 
Against a backdrop of both new scenarios of social change and 
familiar ones of family conflict, the Virginia courts evaluated a 
wide swath of family law claims and helped to make family law in 
the state both more precise and more equitable. 
 
249. Id. at *11. 
250. Id.  
251. Id. 
